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Abstract
If financial markets are perfect, the choice of the sources of finance does not influen-
ce investment decisions. However, financial markets are considered to be far from per-
fect. This review concentrates on the role of information asymmetry in determining real 
investment decisions. Despite the theoretical plausibility of a relationship between capital 
market imperfections and real investments, the empirical literature has found it difficult to 
identify this channel. Overall, more research is needed to identify a method that will not 
be subject to criticisms related to the use of cash-flow in the investment equation and will 
be based on the data that are relatively available across countries and over time.
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1 Introduction
A firm aiming to maximise its value must carry out investment in physical assets up to 
the point at which the marginal yield on physical assets is equal to the firm’s cost per unit 
of capital. In other words, the firm has to proceed with all investments whose net present 
value (NPV) is equal to, or greater than zero. If financial markets function according to 
perfect market assumptions then the firm’s average cost per unit of capital is equal to the 
capitalisation rate of a pure equity stream and the firm’s value is independent of its capital 
structure (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Consequently, the firm is indifferent to the source 408
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of investment finance: equity finance, debt finance, or self finance. So, if financial markets 
are perfect, the choice of the sources of finance does not influence the firm’s investment 
decisions. However, the recent financial crisis has shown how far from perfect financial 
markets can be. This crisis has once again raised the issue of informational asymmetry in 
capital markets. It has demonstrated the possible consequences of capital market imper-
fections for corporate investments and overall real economic activity. Although financi-
al crises are not permanent but irregular events, the problem of asymmetric information 
is permanently present among participants in capital markets. Hence, capital market im-
perfections can have a permanent influence on firms’ investment decisions and real eco-
nomic activity. Analysis of corporate investment determinants has an important position 
in macroeconomics, industrial organization and corporate finance research. This review 
concentrates on developments and challenges in the empirical identification of the relati-
onship between capital market imperfections and real investments. 
The review is organized as follows. To motivate the discussion, section 2 considers 
groundbreaking studies which established the theoretical background of a channel linking 
information asymmetry in capital markets and investment decisions. Section 3 presents 
challenges in the empirical literature and methods used to identify this channel. Section 
4 concludes.
2 Capital market imperfections: theoretical considerations1
2.1 Asymmetric information and equity finance 
Information asymmetry in the equity market assumes that a firm’s management has 
more, or/and better, or/and “earlier” information about the true value of the firm’s existing 
assets, or/and the “quality” of its investment projects. An explanation of why firms can be 
unable or unwilling to raise funds in an equity market in the circumstances of asymmetric 
information is given by Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984) and Myers and Majluf 
(1984). In these circumstances, a firm’s decision not to issue shares signals “good news” 
to investors while, conversely, this firm’s decision that it will issue shares signals “bad 
news” to investors. In particular, investors “read” the equity issue as a signal that the 
firm’s management, having “exclusive” information about the firm, considers existing 
share prices to be overvalued compared to the firm’s true value. Consequently, equity 
issue will induce a decrease in share prices and firm value. Since investors do not have full 
information about the firm’s true value, they “read” every equity issue in the same way. 
The consequence is that an equity issue decreases the firm’s share price, independently 
of the fact whether or not it is truly overvalued. This leads to misallocation of real capital, 
in the firm as well as at the aggregate level. Namely, even in cases when a project’s NPV 
1 The problem of asymmetric information is not the only potential source of capital market imperfections. Other 
potential sources of capital market imperfections include: bankruptcy costs, agency conflict, transaction costs and 
taxes asymmetry. Due to space limitation we focus on the role of information asymmetry in determining investment 
decisions. Furthermore, while this paper concentrates on the interaction of the capital market with companies in need 
of finance, there is a related strand of literature on market imperfections introduced by herding and other aspects of 
the interaction among financial institutions and markets themselves (see Mondeschean and Pecchenino, 1995; for a 
more recent contribution see Haiss, 2010).409
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is positive, firms will sometimes decide not to issue new shares and invest, because the 
decrease in share prices can outweigh any increase in value arising from the project’s 
positive NPV. Accordingly, in most cases firms will try to avoid equity issue as a source 
of financing new investment.
Since equity issue can lead to a decrease in a firm’s share price for reasons other 
than just asymmetric information, for example a change in the firm’s management in-
centives (Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss, 1984), formal verification cannot rely on the 
test of whether share prices decrease when new shares are issued. It has to rely on proof 
that equity issue signals “bad news” for investors. Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984) 
developed a model in which information asymmetry exists only in equity markets while 
in credit markets information is equally distributed between firms’ managers and outsi-
de investors. In this two-period model each firm is characterised by net cash flow stre-
aming from the firm’s existing operations, θ, and a set of new investment opportunities 
with return εQ(K) (where ε is a random variable, whose expected value is E(ε) = 1, vari-
ance var(ε) =σε
2, Q(K) denotes return on new investment and K is the level of investment. 
The θ, which is different for different firms, symbolises the value of the firm’s existing 
assets, or the firm’s true “quality”. So, firms whose initial “qualities” (θ) are different 
have two possibilities to finance investments whose returns, Q(K), are assumed to be the 
same for all firms and investment opportunities. The first possibility is to use the equity 
market where investors do not observe the individual firm’s θ but only the average firm’s 
θ. The second possibility is the debt market where lenders observe θ. At the beginning of 
the period each firm determines the level of investment, K, issues equity in the amount 
e, or not, and finances the remaining investment amount by taking a loan in the amount
b = K – e. Assuming the firms are risk-neutral, they act with the intention of maximizing 
firm value (T). More precisely, the firm (or the firm’s management) is supposed to act in 
a manner such as to maximise the value of the firm held by the “old stock holders”, which 
is represented by the following equation2,
   
(1)
Where V0 is the firm’s initial value, m stands for the weight that the firm places on its 
initial as opposed to its terminal value. The term   represents the share of the firm’s 
assets that will be held by old stock holders at the end of the period. The term in square 
brackets stands for the firm’s value at the end of the period, which proceeds from the cash 
flows streaming from the existing firm’s operations, θ, and from the returns on the new 
investments, Q(K), minus debt obligations, b(1+R), where (1+R) represents the unit cost of 
the debt finance. Taken together, the second term on the right hand side of the equation (1) 
stands for the value of the old stock holders’ assets at the end of the period times the weight 
they place on that value as opposed to the initial value of their assets. Now, assuming that 
2 To simplify presentation we excluded the cost of bankruptcy. This change does not influence any of the essential 
features of the model.410
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every firm can choose between two sources of investment financing, if the firm chooses 
to use exclusively debt finance, its objective function (1), will be modified to:
 T D = mV0
D + (1 – m)θ + Q(KD) – KD (1 + R) (2)
If, on the other hand, it chooses full or partial equity finance then its objective function 
will be:
   
(3)
where e0 stands for the amount of equity the firm sells. V0
D and V0
E are initial values of 
nonequity selling and equity selling firms, respectively. KD and KE are optimal levels of 
investment for a nonequity selling and an equity selling firm, respectively. If we compare 
equations (2) and (3), we can gain insight into the possible difference in a firm’s value that 
is a consequence of different finance decisions. In the case of exclusive debt finance (2), 
the value of the old stock holders’ assets at the end of the period will be lower by the fixed 
amount of the debt repayment obligation, K(1+R). In the case of equity finance (3), the 
value of the old stock holders’ assets at the end of period, which proceeds from the same 
sources, will be lower by the proportion of the new owners’ share in the firm. That is, the 
old stock holders will now receive only a fraction,  , of the firm’s terminal value. 
Since returns on new investment are assumed to be the same for all firms, it is possible, 
by using these modified objective functions, to simulate the firm’s finance decision rule 




or, in compressed form, as,
 H  (θ) = TD (θ) – TE (θ) (5)
Equations (4) or (5) have two implications. First, it is possible to calculate a certa-
in theoretical level of θ, let’s say e θ, where H (e θ) = 0, or in other words some level of cash 
flows streaming from the existing firm’s operations for which TD (θ) = TE (θ), and the firm 
is indifferent between debt and equity finance. Second, it also implies that 
which means that H(θ) is a continuously increasing function of θ. In other words, an in-
crease in the firm’s net cash flow, θ (firm’s true quality), will decrease the advantage equ-
ity finance has over debt finance for the value of old stock holders’ assets at the end of 
the period, as θ approaches e θ from below. At the point where θ reaches e θ the value of old 
stock holders’ assets at the end of the period will be independent of the source of finan-
ce the firm has chosen. Finally, the rise of θ will increase the difference in the value that 
old stock holders can achieve using debt compared to equity finance, as cash flows that 
are streaming from the existing firm’s operations, θ, increase over  e θ. Taken together, this 411
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implies that the firm will use equity finance if its net cash flow is low, and debt finance 
where its net cash flow is high, or more precisely,
 e  =  e0 if θ <  e θ; e = 0 if θ >  e θ  (6)
The intuition is as follows. In both cases the old stock holders will give some amount 
of the cash flows streaming from the firm’s existing operations to finance new investment. 
In the case of debt finance that will always be a fixed absolute amount. In the case of 
equity finance that amount will be a fixed proportion of cash flows that are streaming 
from the firm’s existing operations. Hence, the burden of debt finance will be heavier 
to them in the case when the net cash flow, θ, is lower compared to the burden of equity 
finance, and vice versa.
Overall, this model formally demonstrates that firms with a low asset value will prefer 
to raise funds in the market, where potential outside investors are not able to observe their 
“quality”. Hence, firms entering the equity market will be adversely selected. Accordingly, 
any firm’s decision to issue shares will be read by incompletely informed outside investors 
as “bad news”, although that need not necessarily be the case. 
2.2 Credit rationing
Credit rationing is broadly defined as a situation in which there exists an excess 
demand for loans because quoted loan rates are below the Walrasian market clearing 
level (Jaffe and Stiglitz, 1990:847). Theory of credit rationing aims to explain why the 
duration of such disequilibrium can be permanent, or at least too long to be explained by 
price persistence alone.
As in the case of the equity market, credit rationing theory rests on the assumption 
that a firm’s management and outside investors (intermediaries) do not share the same 
information about the firm and/or its projects’ qualities. In particular, the intermediaries 
(banks) who create supply in this market do not have full information about the “qualities” 
of firms’ projects. The consequences for the credit market can be demonstrated following 
the simple analysis by Waller and Lewarne (1994) of the demand and supply function in 
the credit market. 
As far as the firms who create demand in this market are the fully informed side, 
loan demand, expressed as a function of loan interest rate, can be presented as a standard 
decreasing demand function. Consequently, we proceed further with the analysis of the 
loan supply function. In order to derive a standard marginal cost supply curve, we assume 
that loans are supplied by banks who act as price takers in the market for loans as well as 
in the market for deposits, and whose intention is to maximise profit from their activity. 
As a result they consider the interest rate on loans and deposits as given and choose the 
loan volume that will maximise their profit (π) at each level of the interest rate. It is also 
assumed that in the process of transferring funds from savers to investors banks face 
variable operating costs which are a function of loan size. Finally, banks are assumed to 
be risk neutral. Taking all these assumptions into account, we can describe the bank pro-
fit maximisation function as follows,412
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(7)
Where p is the probability that loans will be repaid, L is loan value and rL is the interest 
rate on loans. Taken together the first term represents the bank’s total revenue. The last 
two terms on the right hand side of the equation represent total costs. Where D stands 
for the total value of deposits, rD is the interest rate on deposits, and q stands for the cost 
parameter of servicing loans.
The relation between the amount of loans supplied and deposits the bank collects can 
be defined as D = bL, where b is the deposits to loans ratio, and where b ≥ 1, meaning that, 
due to reserve requirements, the amount of loans the bank supplies is equal to or lower 
than the amount of deposits it has collected. In that case the bank’s profit maximization 
function can be rewritten as follows,
   
(8)
Maximising equation (8) with respect to L yields the loan supply curve (LS).
   
(9)
From equation (9) it is not difficult to calculate that loan supply is a continuously 
increasing function of the loan interest rate  , since p>0 and q>0. Hence, the 
deduced loan supply curve can be presented (by inverting this derivative) as a standard 
supply curve. 
This implies that any excess demand for loans will be eliminated by increasing the 
loan interest rate, as in any “standard” market. Therefore, any permanent disequilibrium is 
not possible in this market. The only thing that can happen is short-term excess demand, 
which will last only as long as the loan interest rate does not rise enough to restore a new, 
market-clearing equilibrium. Even if, for some reasons, the probability of repayment (p) 
decreases, the loan supply curve, although steeper, will still be an increasing function 
of the loan interest rate. The equilibrium amount of loans will then be smaller but the 
above conclusions and their implications will be unchanged. Hence, the feature that 
loans may not be repaid due to default is not enough to produce credit rationing, that is, 
permanent disequilibrium in the loans market. However, if we include the assumption that 
the probability of loan repayment (p) is dependent upon the loan interest rate (or, more 
precisely, that the probability of loan repayment is inversely related to the interest rate)
   
(10)
and if we augment the loan supply curve, equation (9), with an endogenously determined 
loan repayment rate, equation (10), we obtain the following loan supply curve.413
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(11)
It is not difficult to calculate that the slope of this new loan supply curve is not the 
same as before and that now the slope is, 
   
(12)
where   is the elasticity of the probability of loan repayment with respect to the 
interest rate. The ep measures the percentage change in the probability of loan repayment 
in response to one percentage change in the loan interest rate, and is negative by assump-
tion from equation (10),  . The ep makes it possible to demonstrate that the loan 
supply function is not always a continuously rising function of the interest rate, but that 
at some point it can become a decreasing function of the interest rate. This key element 
of credit rationing theory can be graphically presented by figure 1.










If we draw the loan supply curve based on equations (11) and (12) we obtain a bac-
kward-bending supply curve. The loan supply curve is, now, an increasing function of 
the loan interest rate up to the point where ep reaches -1. At the point where ep = -1 the 
rate of change in (12) reduces to zero. When ep falls below -1 the slope of the supply fun-
ction turns negative and the loan supply function becomes a decreasing function of the 
loan interest rate.414
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This implies that the quantity of loans supplied increases with the interest rate only 
until the loan interest rate reaches the turning point, e rL. If at that interest rate excess 
demand for loans is still present in the market, then the market will be characterised by 
permanent disequilibrium. The excess demand for loans in that case will not be eliminated 
by a rising loan interest rate, as standard economic theory assumes, for above e rL  a bank’s 
profit decreases with the loan interest rate and it will be willing to offer not more but 
fewer loans at higher interest rates. The intuition behind this is as follows. Increases in the 
interest rate have two effects on bank profit. The first is positive and leads to an increase 
in a bank’s profit, because every loan now is charged at a higher interest rate. The second 
effect is negative and leads to a decrease in a bank’s profit, because a rise in the interest 
rate brings about a decrease in the probability that loans will be repaid (equation 10). When 
the loan interest rate is above e rL, the second effect outweighs the first, meaning that the 
increase in the interest rate will reduce the bank’s profit, hence loan supply will decrease. 
Consequently, the market loan interest rate will stay persistently at the e rL  level despite the 
existence of excess demand for loans at that level of rL. 
2.3 Adverse selection and incentive effects
The possibility of credit rationing relies on the assumption that loan repayment 
probability is inversely related to the interest rate. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) provided two 
basic explanations for this assumption: adverse selection and incentive effects. 
The adverse selection effect assumes that asymmetry in information arises ex-ante. 
It suggests that the mix of applicants changes adversely as the interest rate increases. In 
other words, as the interest rate rises borrowers from whose projects banks have higher 
expected revenues (safer projects) drop out of the market and the market becomes do-
minated by borrowers from whose projects banks have lower expected revenues (riskier 
projects). Since banks cannot distinguish among different type of borrowers, they charge 
them all the same interest rate. So, the change in the mix of applicants will shrink total 
bank revenue and hence profit. The main reason behind this adverse selection effect is that 
in the case when an investment project is financed by debt (fixed repayment obligation) 
any increase in project riskiness changes banks’ and firms’ expected profit in the opposi-
te direction. From the firms’ point of view, expected profit increases with riskier projects. 
Conversely, from the bank’s point of view expected profit decreases with project riskine-
ss. As the interest rate rises, firms’ cost of project financing increases, so firms with less 
profitable, hence less risky, projects, drop out of the market one by one. The consequen-
ce is a change in the mix of loan applicants that banks face. The average project is now 
more risky, hence less profitable for the bank. 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) constructed a model in which economic agents who want 
to invest have to borrow money from banks3. Each firm (borrower) is endowed with the 
same size project, L, and all those projects have the same expected mean return E(R). The 
only difference among firms is in the projects’ riskiness. Different projects have different 
probability distributions of project returns, f(R,θ); where θ represents the dispersion of a 
3 To simplify presentation we excluded collateral. This change does not influence any of the essential features 
of the model.415
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project’s returns around its expected value, E(R), and where higher θ corresponds to a gre-
ater risk in the Rothschild and Stiglitz’s (1970) “mean preserving sense”.4 For example, 
figure 2 presents two projects. As we can see projects 1 and 2 have the same mean expec-
ted returns, but the returns probability distribution function, f(R,θ2), has more weight on 
its tails. Hence, project 2 is riskier in the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) “mean preserving 
sense” than project 1. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) also assume that banks are not able to 
observe individual firms’ project riskiness, θ. Hence, they charge all loan applicants the 
same loan interest rate, r. Accordingly, the revenue banks will earn from the loan depen-
ds on both the interest rate they charge and the return realization of the financed project. 
The bank’s revenue function can be represented as follows,
 ρ (R, r) = min(L (1 + r); R) (13)
where ρ denotes the bank’s revenue. R is the project’s realized return. r stands for the loan 
interest rate. Finally, L is project size and also loan size. Equation (13) implies that the 
bank will receive full loan repayment L (1+r) if the project’s realized return is R > L (1+r). 
Conversely, if R is lower than the loan repayment then the firm will declare bankruptcy 
and the bank will receive only R. Figure 3 below depicts the bank’s revenue (13) condi-
tioned upon the project’s realized return. As we can see, the bank’s revenue function is a 
concave function of the realized project returns, for the bank’s revenue from the project 
increases up to the point at which the realized project returns reach the amount necessary 
for full loan repayment. After that point, the bank’s revenue stays constant, because it is 
independent of how much the realized project returns increase. 
The firm’s earnings from the project also depend on the interest rate the bank charges 
and the return realization of its project. However, the limited liability assumption makes 
the firm’s profit function as follows, 
 π (R, r) = max(R – L (1 + r); 0)   (14)
This means that the firm’s profit from the project will be R – L (1 + r) in cases in which 
project return realization is R > L (1 + r). Conversely, if R < L (1 + r) then the firm will 
declare bankruptcy and its profit will be 0. Figure 4 below depicts the firm’s profit function 
(14) conditioned upon the project’s realized return. As we can see, the firm profit function 
is a convex function of realized project returns. In other words, the firm’s profits (losses) 
stay at zero up to the point where realized project returns fall short of the amount neces-
sary for full loan repayment. Above that point, the firm’s profit increases proportionally 
4 Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) addressed the question of in which case a random variable Y is more variable 
(more risky) than another random variable X with the same expected value. There are at least four plausible answers to 
this question. These are: Y is equal to X plus noise; all risk averters prefer X to Y; Y has more weight in the tails than 
X; Y has a greater variance than X. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) demonstrated that the concept of increasing risk is 
not equivalent to that implied by equating risk of X with the variance of X. They showed, that is, that the first three 
approaches lead to a single definition of greater riskiness, different from that of the fourth approach. Using Stiglitz 
and Weiss’s (1981) notation from above Rothschild and Stiglitz’s (1970) definition of greater riskiness can be formu-
lated as follows. Between two projects that have the same mean expected return, 
∞
0 Rf (R, θ1)dR = 
∞
0 Rf (R, θ2)dR, risk-
averse economic agents will prefer the project with dispersion θ1 to the one with θ2 if, 
a
0 F (R, θ1)dR = 
a
0 Rf (R, θ2)dR; 
a ≥ 0. Although less intuitive, according to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), this definition is more consistent with the 
natural meaning of increasing risk than the variance definition.416
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with realized project returns. If we consider the firm’s profit function (figure 4) and pro-
ject returns probability distributions (figure 2) together it is possible to provide an intuiti-
ve explanation of why in a case in which projects are financed by debt, the firm’s expec-
ted profit increases with the project risk. As we can see, a riskier project, with dispersi-
on θ2, is more profitable to the firm simply because the probability of favourable events, 
high return realizations and high profits associated with those returns, is greater than for 
a project with dispersion θ1. Symmetrically, the probability of unfavourable events, low 
return realizations and the associated bankruptcy is greater for the project with θ2 than 
for the one with θ1. However, the losses the firm will suffer in those circumstances are 
limited to zero by the firm’s limited liability assumption. Under assumption that cost of 
financing, r, is the same for both projects this implies that from the firm’s point of view 
the expected profitability of the riskier project 2 is higher than the expected profitability 
of the less risky project 1. Therefore, as the cost of project financing, r, increases, firms 
with less profitable (projects with lower expected profitability) and at the same time less 
risky projects, drop out of the market one by one. The consequence is a change in the mix 










Project’s realized return (R) L(1+r)
Figure 2: Project returns probability distributions




Project’s realized return (R) L(1+r)
Figure 4: The firm’s profit function417
B. Ćorić: Investments and capital market imperfections, identiﬁ  cation issues: a survey
Financial Theory and Practice 34 (4) 407-434 (2010)
In a more formal way, it is possible to formulate the firm’s expected profit function 
(Π) as a function of the interest rate banks charge (r) and the dispersion of project returns 
around its mean expected value, that is, project riskiness (θ)5 
  Π (r, θ) = ∫0 max [R – L(r + 1); 0]dF (R, θ)
∞
  (15)
where the firm’s expected profit is an increasing function of project riskiness,  , 
for the reasons explained above, and a decreasing function of interest rate,  , sim-
ply because an increase in interest rate raises the cost of project financing. From equation 
(15) it is possible to find, for a given interest rate, some threshold level of project riskiness
( e θ) for which the expected profit level is equal to zero
  Π (r,  e θ) = ∫0  max [R – L(r + 1); 0]dF (R,  e θ) = 0
∞
  (16)
At that interest rate only firms whose project riskiness is higher than the threshold 
value,  e θ, (θ > e θ) will apply for loans and undertake projects, simply because only those 
firm’s projects will be profitable. All other firms, whose project riskiness is, θ <  e θ will 
find it unprofitable to undertake projects and will drop out of the loans market. The rela-
tion between the interest rate, r, and the threshold project riskiness value,  e θ, can be obta-
ined from the total differential of the above firm’s expected profit function (16)
   
(17)
from which we can express the derivative of the threshold project riskiness level,  e θ, upon 
loan interest rate, r, as: 
   
(18)
Equation (18) indicates a positive relation between the interest rate and the threshold 
project riskiness level. More precisely, it indicates that an increase in the interest rate leads 
to an increase of the threshold project riskiness level ( e θ), that is the level of project riski-
ness below which the firm does not apply for loans and does not undertake investment 
projects. Therefore, as the loan interest rate increases, the threshold level of project riski-
ness,   e θ, rises and firms with less risky projects one by one leave the credit market, there-
by changing the mix of projects in the market in favour of higher risk projects. 
5 The difference between the firm’s profit (14) and the firm’s expected profit function (15) is that the latter is no 
longer conditioned upon realized but upon expected project returns, whose realizations are expected to range from 0 
to ∞ and are ruled by the project’s cumulative probability distribution function F(R,θ). 418
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If we now consider the bank revenue function (figure 3) and project returns probabi-
lity distributions (figure 2) together, it should become clearer why this change in the mix 
of applicants is unfavourable to the bank. As we can see, the riskier project, with dispersi-
on θ2, is less profitable to the bank simply because the probability of unfavourable events, 
low return realizations and low revenues (losses) associated with those returns is greater 
than for the project with dispersion θ1. Again, the probability of favourable events, high 
return realizations and associated high revenues is greater for project θ2 than for θ1. Yet the 
revenues the bank receives in this case are limited by the size of the loan repayment rate, 
L(1+r). From the bank’s point of view this implies that expected profitability from the ri-
skier project 2 is lower than expected profitability from the less risky project 1. Consequ-
ently, a change in the mix of loan applicants from low to higher risk, caused by an incre-
ase in the loan interest rate, hurts bank profitability. Hence, the bank’s profit will not be 
a continuously increasing function of the loan interest rate, but will, actually, start to dec-
line, with the bank’s loan supply, above some interest rate level, say i r, as we have shown 
in the previous section. 
Contrary to the adverse selection effect, the adverse incentive effect or moral hazard 
problem takes place once the loan has been received. The adverse incentive effect assu-
mes that asymmetry in information arises ex-post because banks cannot observe which 
type of project the firm actually undertakes. For the reasons explained above, higher in-
terest rates will induce borrowers to undertake riskier projects. The change in the mix of 
undertaken projects will shrink banks’ expected revenue (profit) and will cause a fall in 
the loan supply above some level of the interest rate.
The outcome of these findings is straightforward. Insofar as firms very often are not 
willing to enter the equity market due to the asymmetric information problem, the exi-
stence of credit rationing in the loans market implies that firms’ ability to raise investment 
funds externally can be constrained. Hence, a firm’s investment will not be determined just 
by the NPV of its projects but also by the availability of an internal source of finance.
It is necessary to emphasise here that the credit rationing theory does not imply that 
excess demand will always be present in the loan market. The credit rationing outcome 
just demonstrates that permanent excess demand in the loan market is possible (Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981). The lenders use various techniques to tackle this problem, for example, 
screening; selecting among borrowers; monitoring (inspection of borrowers’ cash flows, 
balance sheet position, management, realized return, etc.); engaging in a long-term relati-
onship with borrowers; and enforcement of restrictive covenants such as a minimum sol-
vency ratio or a minimum cash balance, etc. (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). The use of all 
these techniques requires the commitment of lenders’ real resources. Hence, their usage 
imposes real costs on lenders for which they have to be compensated. The consequence is 
that even in the cases when these techniques are able to reveal all the hidden or unobser-
vable borrowers’ characteristics, their implementation makes external sources of finance 
(debt finance) more expensive to the borrower compared to the use of internal finance, 
where these costs are not present. In other words, in this case there will still be an exter-
nal finance premium (difference between the cost of funds raised externally and opportu-
nity costs internal to the firm) expressed in the form of the higher interest rate borrowers 419
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will be asked to pay on external funds. Hence, the firm’s investment level will again be 
affected by the availability of internal source of finance.
This review illustrates only the basic theoretical background of the channel linking 
capital market imperfections and asymmetric information in the equity and credit markets. 
The above considered groundbreaking studies have inspired an enormous literature about 
the sources, kinds and consequences of information asymmetry in capital markets (seminal 
contributions include: Bester, 1985; Gale and Hellwig, 1985; De Meza and Webb, 1987, 
1992; Williamson, 1987; Diamond, 1991; Boot and Thakor, 1993; Pagano and Jappelli, 
1993; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; more recent ones include: Hellmann and Stiglitz, 
2000; Clementi and Hopenhayn, 2006; Inderst and Meller, 2007; Arnold and Riley, 2009; 
Morellec and Schurhoff, 2010; Tinn, 2010).
3 Identification issues
Despite the theoretical plausibility of a relationship between capital market 
imperfections and investment, empirical literature has found it difficult to identify this 
channel. The main problem of this literature is the inability directly to observe and measure 
the external finance premium. Faced with that obstacle, researchers have developed various 
estimation strategies. The literature was initiated by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) 
(FHP). FHP used a Tobin Q investment model to test for the effect of capital market 
imperfections on firms’ investment. Tobin’s Q theory of investment formalizes the 
Keynesian notion that the incentive to built new capital depends on the market value of 
the capital relative to the cost of constructing this capital. If an additional unit of installed 
capital raised the market value of the firm by more than the cost of acquiring the capital 
and putting it in place, then a value-maximising firm should acquire it and put it in place. 
To capture this notion in an observable quantitative measure, Tobin defined the variable 
q to be the ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement cost of its capital stock. 
He then argued that investment is an increasing function of q. The Q theory of investment 
is based on the notion that all relevant information is captured by the market valuation 
of the firm, and therefore other variables such as cash flow, profit, or capacity utilization 
should have no additional predictive power for investment (Abel, 1990). FHP estimated 
the following Tobin’s Q investment model for a panel of manufacturing firms 
   
(19)
where (I/K)it is the value of the investment (I) of firm i in the time period t divided by the 
value of the firm’s beginning of the period capital stock (K). Qit, the so called average q for 
firm i in period t, is a proxy for the Tobin’s marginal q. (CF/K)it is the ratio of the firm’s 
i cash flow to capital stock in the period t, and it is used as a proxy for firms’ internal 
sources of finance. Overall, equation (19) specifies a standard Q model of investment 
augmented by a proxy for firms’ internal sources of finance. Underlying the FHP approach 
is the premise that firms’ ability and/or the terms under which they are able to borrow, 
hence also their investment, are the function of their internal sources of finance. In a 420
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case in which this is true, the estimated coefficient on variable which measures firms’ 
internal sources of finance should be positive and statistically significant when it enters the 
investment regression equation. Moreover, its inclusion should increase the explanatory 
power of the standard investment specification. On the other hand, if financial markets are 
frictionless, as in the Modigliani and Miller (1958) model, then the estimated coefficients 
on the internal sources of finance variable should not be statistically different from zero. 
In additional, it should not increase the explanatory power of the investment equation 
model. The problem with this conclusion is the well-known objection that cash flow 
gains significance in investment equations only because of its predictive power over 
the expected investment profitability. To avoid these objections FHP divided firms into 
different categories, according to the likelihood of facing financial constraints when they 
raise investment funds externally, and estimated equation (19) for each group of firms 
separately. The criterion used for this purpose was the firms’ profit retention ratio, that is, 
their dividend policy. Namely, according to FHP if the external costs of finance are higher 
than the internal resources, then it is not optimal for the firm to pay dividends and finance 
profitable investment opportunities from external sources. So, the firms which had the 
lowest dividends to income ratio in the sample were classified into the class of firms that 
are most likely to face financial constraints (Class 1). On the other hand, the class of firms 
for which the probability of facing financial constraints was the lowest were those with 
the highest dividends to income ratio in the sample (Class 3). Finally, the firms whose 
retention ratio was between these categories were allocated to Class 2. The results were 
in line with the prediction of the capital market imperfection theory. In particular, the cash 
flow coefficient in the equations they estimated had a uniformly positive sign and declined 
monotonically through firm classes. It was almost three times larger for Class 1 firms than 
for Class 3 firms, with Class 2 firms positioned between those two estimates. As a result 
of the inclusion of cash flow into the standard Tobin Q model of investment, the explained 
proportions of the variance of I/K increased for all firm classes. Moreover, adding the cash 
flow increased the adjusted R2 most for Class 1 and least for Class 3. 
Some authors raised concerns that dividend payment is an imperfect sample split 
criterion. Without an explicit modelling of why firms pay dividends we can not be sure 
that firms which do not pay dividends are financially constrained and vice versa. For 
example, if the cutting of dividends is taken to be a negative signal, many financially 
constrained firms may be “forced” to proceed with the same dividends payment strategy 
despite the problems they face (Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990). A decrease in the firm’s 
value which would arise due to missing a positive investment opportunity can be lower 
than a decrease which would arise due to a decrease in share prices. Concerned with this 
possibility, some authors have used different kinds of sample division. 
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991), who studied the investment behaviour 
of Japanese companies, used firms’ membership in industrial groups as a sample split 
criterion. The firms which are members of industry groups known in Japan as keiretsu 
can create internal financial markets. In these markets they should be less exposed to 
asymmetric information, due to the exclusive information they possess about each other. 
On the other hand, the ownership stakes that banks have in these companies can also 
help them to gain better information and control over firms’ businesses. The results of 421
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empirical analysis revealed that the Japanese firms which are not affiliated with this 
industry group are much more sensitive to fluctuations in internal sources of finance than 
keiretsu members. The same results were obtained by Schaller (1993) who separated his 
sample of Canadian firms based on their membership of an industry group. Devereux and 
Schiantatareli (1990), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and 
Vermeulen (2002), have argued that firm size is the proper sample criterion. Since larger 
firms are usually more mature businesses with long established reputations, they are less 
likely to suffer from asymmetric information problems. The same reasoning induced 
Schaller (1993) to classify firms according to their age. The possession of a bond rating 
was proposed by Whited (1992) and Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) as another sample 
division criterion. The intuition behind it was the signalling effect of bond rating. The 
same intuition led Calomiris, Himmelberg and Wachtel (1995) to divide their sample 
into two groups comprising those companies that issue commercial papers and those that 
do not. In general, the studies, irrespective of specific sample split criteria, find a much 
stronger effect of changes in internal funds on investment for the groups of firms which 
they classified as financially constrained. 
However, all the above sample split criteria can be criticized as incomplete (Hu and 
Schiantarelli, 1998). First, the probability that some firm faces financial constraints is a 
function of many factors. Hence, the reliable sample split criterion must include and pro-
perly evaluate all these factors. Second, the firm’s position on this “scale” is not fixed and 
independent of its activities. In other words, a firm can become more or less constrained 
over time. Therefore, any classification into groups that are fixed through a sample peri-
od is not appropriate. As a remedy Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) proposed the endogeno-
us switching regression model in which each firm in each time period can operate in eit-
her a financially constrained or unconstrained regime. The probability for any firm to be 
classified in one of these regimes is determined by the switching function, which inclu-
des both firms’ financial variables (debt to asset ratios, interest expense to income ratios, 
liquid financial asset to capital ratios) and non financial variables (size, bond rating). The 
regression analysis they conducted, using this sample split technique, confirmed earlier 
FHP findings. The same sample split criterion, with the same outcome, was also used by 
Hovakimian and Titman (2006), and Almeida and Campello (2007).
The use of cash flows as a measure of internal funds was also questioned by the lite-
rature. The significant positive effect of cash flow in the investment equation can be a re-
sult of the possible correlation between cash flow and expected investment profitability 
(Hubbard, 1998). In other words, high cash flow indicates that the firm’s past investment 
decision was correct and also that the temporary demand for its product is high (Zarnovitz, 
1999). Taken together, this gives confidence to the firm’s management to perceive inves-
tment as profitable. At a point of time, a cross-sectional link is also problematic, because 
firms with high cash flows have successful investments or low costs and hence incenti-
ves to invest in new capacities (Hubbard, 1998). Due to these concerns many researchers 
have shared the opinion that in the attempt to assess the effect of financial constraints on 
investment one should control for the effect of future investment opportunities (Hubbard, 
1998). The widespread use of Tobin’s Q formulation in this literature arose mainly due to 
this concern. Various other investment equation specifications were also used in this lite-422
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rature, for example: the sales accelerator approach (FHP, Vermeulen, 2002); Jorgenson’s 
neoclassical formulation (FHP); the error correction model (Bond, Elston, Mairesse and 
Mulkay, 2003); Euler equation of the dynamic optimization problem of firms (Whited, 
1992; Bond and Meghir, 1994; Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited, 1995; Bond, Elston, Mai-
resse and Mulkay, 2003); and different combinations of those approaches (Hoshi, Kashyap 
and Scharfstein, 1990, 1991; Audretsch and Elston, 2002). Yet, among all these specifica-
tions only Tobin’s Q investment theory explicitly claims to be able to control for changes 
in investment opportunities. Proponents of the Tobin Q investment specification argue that 
average q on the right hand side of Equation (19) is a good proxy for this information. If 
average q effectively controls for the effects of changes in investment opportunities, the 
significance of cash flow should contain information only on financial constraints. Anot-
her problem is that cash flow is only one part of firms’ internal source of finance. Partly 
due to this reason, and partly because of the previously mentioned problems with cash 
flows, some authors (Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1991; Vermeulen, 2002) construc-
ted and used other proxies for the internal source of finance. Some of these are: the amo-
unt of short-term securities at the beginning of the period; total debt as a fraction of total 
assets and short-term debt as fraction of short-term assets. In general, the results obtai-
ned by these measures of internal sources of finance confirmed the previously mentioned 
findings, despite the results being less strong and significant. The problem with most of 
these measures is that they measure the book rather than the market value of a firm’s in-
ternal sources of finance. Hence, there is no guarantee that they are able to correctly pick 
up the effects of economic shocks on firms’ internal sources of finance. Overall, although 
cash flow is an imperfect proxy for internal sources of finance, its widespread use arises 
due to the fact that it is the only such measure available for internal sources of finance in 
most cases (Hubbard, 1998). 
The most serious criticisms of the FHP methodology come from the recent resear-
ches of Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Gomes (2001), Alti (2003), Cummins, Hassett and 
Oliner (2006), and Whited (2006). 
The Kaplan and Zingales (1997) (KZ) objection to the FHP approach is two-fold. First, 
they disqualified FHP’s empirical findings and claim to have obtained opposing results 
when examining the FHP data sets in more detail. Second, they argue that there are no 
prior theoretical reasons to assume that investment cash flow sensitivity is monotonically 
increasing in the degree of financing constraint. 
In their empirical work, KZ re-examined the sample of 49 low-dividend firms from 
FHP, using the same methodology but different sample split criteria. To detect possible 
financial constraints they analysed each firm’s annual report for each year, paying parti-
cular attention to the discussion about liquidity demand and availability of external and 
internal funds. This qualitative information, together with quantitative information about 
firms’ cash stocks, unused credit lines and leverage enable them to classify these 49 firms 
into five firm-year categories. Testing investment-cash flow sensitivity for each group se-
parately, they found that firms classified into the financially most constrained group ex-
hibit the lowest sensitivity of investment to cash flow. Consequently, according to KZ, 
it seems that investment cash flow sensitivity is not a valid test for the effect of financial 423
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constraints on investments. Following KZ, Cleary (1999) obtained the same results for a 
larger sample (1,317 firms) of the US firms.
FHP (2000) challenged these results on several grounds. First, since firms are not obli-
ged to declare explicitly whether or not they face difficulties in financing their investment, 
this criterion is ambiguous. Second, firms’ cash stocks, unused credit lines and levera-
ge are also not an appropriate measure of financial constraints. Firms can have high cash 
stocks or keep unused credit lines not because they do not face constraints in attempts to 
raise external funds, but quite the opposite. A forward looking firm aware that it may face 
problems of raising external finance, may find it reasonable to keep large cash stocks and 
unused credit lines as precautionary buffer stocks. Finally, a low leverage level also does 
not necessarily mean that the firm is not credit constrained but can also signal that the 
firm is not able to obtain credit. Overall, according to FHP (2000) KZ’s empirical results 
come from the fact that their methodology tends to classify financially distressed firms as 
constrained. Since financially distressed firms are more likely to use cash flow to enhan-
ce liquidity, repay loans and avoid bankruptcy than to finance investment, the KZ findin-
gs should not be surprising. They are a product of a wrong classification strategy rather 
then a proof that the FHP methodology is incorrect (FHP, 2000). 
The second KZ objection to the FHP methodology is theoretical. KZ argue that 
there are no strong theoretical reasons to expect that investment-cash flow sensitivity 
increases monotonically with the degree of financial constraints. In other words, the effect 
of changes in firms’ internal source of finance (measured by cash flow) on investment 
is not necessarily the strongest for the financially most constrained firms and vice versa. 
According to KZ a firm is supposed to choose the optimal level of investment in fixed 
capital (I) to maximize the following objective function 
 max[F(I) – I – C(E, k)]; I = W + E (20)
where F(I) is a single factor production function with standard properties (F’ > 0, and F’’ 
< 0). The sources of investment finance are external (E) and internal funds (W). Due to 
asymmetric information, agency costs or risk aversion, external funds generate additional 
costs, which are represented by the cost function C(E,k), where E is the amount of external 
funds used to finance investment and k is the measure of firms’ wedge between the cost 
of funds raised internally and externally. Furthermore, C is assumed to be convex in E. 
So, the first term in the square brackets represents revenues from investment and the 
last two terms stand for costs of investment. Taking internal funds (W) and the wedge 
between costs of internal and external funds (k) as given, the firm’s task is to choose the 
level of investment (I) which maximises their profit. The first-order condition for profit 
maximization of (20) is,
 F 1(I) – 1 – C1 (I – W, k) = 0 (21)
where F1 represents the first derivative of F with respect to I. C1 is the partial derivative 
of C with respect to its first argument. The effect of change of internal funds on the firm’s 
investments (dI/dW) is calculated by implicit differentiation of (21)424
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(22)
where F11 represents the second derivative of F with respect to I. C11 is the second partial 
derivative of C with respect to its first argument,   is clearly positive as far as C11 is 
greater than zero and F11 is negative as assumed above. That is, the firm’s investment (I) 
increases with the availability of internal funds (W) if the firm is financially constrained. 
On the other hand, if capital markets are frictionless, then the internal source of finance 
does not affect investment decisions (dI/dW = 0, since C = 0 and then C11 is also 0). Hence, 
it is clear that changes in internal funds influence the investment of financially constrai-
ned firms. Yet, something that is not clear, according to KZ, is the statement that the in-
vestment cash flow sensitivity (dI/dW) should monotonically decrease with respect to W. 
In other words, there is no reason to expect that the same change in internal funds (ΔW) 
would induce a smaller change in the investments of a firm with high internal funds, than 
in the investments of a firm with low internal funds. This can be seen if we calculate the 
change in investment-cash flow sensitivity with respect to W from equation (22)
   
(23)
Transforming (23) we can express it as 
   
(24)
where F111 represents the third derivative of F with respect to I. C111 is the third partial de-
rivative of C with respect to its first argument. Given that the second term is always po-
sitive, change in investment-cash flow sensitivity with respect to W, d2I/dW2 is negative 
only if the first term (F111/F2
11 – C111/C2
11) is negative. To be fulfilled, this condition asks 
for a certain relationship between the form (curvature) of the production function (F) and 
the external funds cost function (C1). Hence, change in investment-cash flow sensitivi-
ty with respect to W (d2I/dW2) is not universally negative. This can be presented graphi-
cally as in FHP (2000).
Figure 5 presents the investment market graphically. The quantity of capital the firm 
invests and the price of that capital is determined by the intersection of demand (F1) and 
supply of capital (C1). The firm’s capital (investment) demand function, F1, is a decrea-
sing function of the cost of funds. The capital supply function is horizontal up to the point 
beyond which the firm’s investment cannot be financed by its own funds, where WL de-
notes low and WH a high quantity of internal funds. The horizontal segment indicates the 
constant marginal cost of investment funds the firm faces for internal finance. After that 
point, the capital supply function is increasing (C11>0). The positive slope segment indi-
cates the rising marginal costs the firm faces when it raises external finance above its in-
ternal sources. So, CL
1 and CH
1 represent the costs of investment funds for firms with low 425
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and high internal funds respectively. As we can see, the effects of a change in internal 
funds (ΔW) on the firm’s investment depend on the firm’s initial level of internal funds and 
on the shape of the capital demand and supply functions. So, the same change in internal 
funds (ΔW) would induce a larger change in the investments of a firm with high internal 
funds (WH) than in the investments of a firm with low internal funds (WL) (in other words, 
investment-cash flow sensitivity (d2I/dW2) would be positive) when, for example6: 
•   the capital supply function (C1) is concave (C11>0, C111<0) in their external finan-
ce part and the capital demand function (F1) is linear (F11<0, F111=0) as in figure 
5, panel a7; 
•   or when the capital supply function (C1) is linear (C11>0, C111=0) and the capital de-
mand function (F1) is convex (F11<0, F111>0), as in figure 5, panel b.8
According to FHP (2000), the KZ model misses the point and does not provide a cri-
tique of this literature. They argue that the level of the firm’s internal funds, W, is not a cri-
terion that classifies firms as financially constrained or unconstrained. None of the studies 
in this literature uses the level of the firm’s internal funds, W, as a sample division crite-
rion. Firms should be classified based on intrinsic characteristics that make them more or 
less exposed to the asymmetric information problem. The firms that are more exposed to 
asymmetric information will face higher costs per unit of external finance. Hence, their 
changes in investment due to changes in internal sources (dI/dW) should be larger. The 
6 It is possible to figure out other cases when (d2I/dW2) would be positive. However, for the validity of KZ argu-
mentation it is sufficient that there exists at least one such case. Hence, due to space limitation we illustrate only cases 
which are originally considered by KZ.
7 The capital supply function (C1) can be concave, if for example the firm exhibits economy of scale when rais-
ing external funds. Namely, if the firm raises external finance by bond issue, then marginal costs decrease with the 
size of the bond issue, due to fixed costs accompanying the issuance.
8The capital demand function (F1) can be convex if, for example, the firm production function exhibits decreas-
ing returns on capital investment.
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necessary condition for dI/dW of financially constrained firms to be larger than dI/dW of 
financially unconstrained firms according to (22) is,
   
(25)
from which, by rearranging, we obtain, 
   (26)
According to FHP (2000), there are no prior reasons why the firm production functi-
on (F) should be systematically different between constrained and unconstrained firms. 
Hence, the only necessary condition that should be fulfilled for the investment of finan-
cially constrained firms to be more sensitive to changes in W compared to financially un-
constrained firms’ investment is C11
Constrained > C11
Unconstrained. That is, constrained firms sho-
uld face a relatively steep capital supply curve, above their internal funds level, com-
pared to unconstrained firms. A graphic presentation of this argument should make this 
more appealing. 






Investment and financing flow
∆W
CH1
*The diagram assumes that capital supply curve is linear (C11>0, C111=0). The conclusion does not 
change if we assume that capital supply curve is concave (C11<0, C111<0) as in figure 5 panel (a).
As we can see from figure 6, as long as the capital supply curve for financially con-
strained firms is steep compared to the supply curve for unconstrained firms, their inves-
tment will change more when internal sources of finance change. In other words, as long 
as marginal costs of external finance increase at a higher rate for constrained firms, the 
rise in internal funds (ΔW) will bring them a larger decrease in financing costs, hence a 
larger increase of investments as well. So, the only relevant question about the methodo-
logy of this literature is whether or not researchers classified firms in ways to generate 
large enough differences in C11 (FHP, 2000). 427
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Gomes (2001) and Alti (2003) reconsidered the well known question about the abili-
ty of average q to measure future investment opportunities, as well as a possible spurious 
correlation between investment and cash flow.
Gomes (2001) developed a formal model of investment and created two sets of artifi-
cial firm-level data. In the first variant of the model financial market frictions were expre-
ssed by transactions costs arising from the firm’s external financing. In the second variant 
of the model these transaction costs were equalized to zero. Firms in both models were 
supposed to maximize their profits over time by making a decision about participation 
in the goods’ market, the level of investment and the source of finance. Tobin’s Q inves-
tment equation augmented by a cash flow variable was estimated for each data set sepa-
rately. The estimated coefficient on cash flow obtained from the first data set appears to 
be significant. However, the cash flow was also significant in the equation estimated by 
the second data set. More importantly, the addition of the cash flow variable to the Q in-
vestment formulation does not add any new explanatory power to either regression. Con-
sequently, according to Gomes (2001), not only is the existence of financial constraints 
insufficient to establish cash flow as a significant regressor beyond average q, but it also 
appears not to be necessary. The correlation between investment and cash flow arose due 
to the strong colinearity between average q and cash flow in his model. Hence, it is possi-
ble that measurement error in the construction of average q reduces correlation between 
average q and investments. Consequently, it generates a spurious correlation between cash 
flow and investment, and induces the increase of adjusted R2 when cash flow is added to 
the investment equation. In other words, it is possible that all the investment equations’ 
characteristics, observed by many authors in real data, are the result of imprecise measu-
rement of average q. To illustrate this point, Gomes (2001) introduced measurement errors 
of average q in the artificial data set and estimated investment regression for this data set. 
The regression results revealed that inclusion of cash flow in Tobin’s Q investment equa-
tion in this case does increase the explanatory power of the investment equation. 
Following a very similar methodology Alti (2003) found that cash flow appears as a 
significant variable in the Tobin Q investment equation. However, the regression was run 
on an artificial set of data, which was generated based on a frictionless investment model. 
Moreover, the magnitude of the cash flow effect roughly replicates the magnitude obtained 
by FHP, with the highest values for the low dividend to income ratio firms group. Yet the 
difference in cash flow sensitivity among different groups of firms in his artificial sample 
arises from the low dividend to income ratio being a characteristic of young high growth 
firms. According to the model specification, young firms are mainly financed with credits, 
hence they start to pay dividends only after they have fulfilled their debt obligations. At the 
same time, cash flow is shown to be a better measure for young firms’ growth prospects. 
That is, every firm in the model starts its lifetime facing uncertainty about its project 
quality. That uncertainty is resolved over time as cash flows provide information about 
the validity of firms’ investments decisions. Since young firms are much more insecure 
about their prospects, they revise their plans much more aggressively in response to cash 
flow changes. These characteristics intensify the connection between investment and cash 
flow for young, low dividend, firms. 428
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In a separate line of research, Erickson and Whited (2000), Cummins, Hassett and 
Oliner (2006), and Whited (2006) found that the cash-flow effect in investment regressi-
ons greatly diminishes when measurement errors in average q are taken into account. No-
tably et al. (2006) employ the firm-specific earnings forecasts from securities analysts to 
construct a measure of average q. Average q is supposed to measure the ratio of the firm’s 
intrinsic value to the replacement costs of its assets. Since the firm’s intrinsic value is uno-
bservable, its market value is usually employed as a proxy of its intrinsic value. However, 
the stock market may measure the firm’s intrinsic value with considerable and persistent 
error. To investigate this potential source of measurement error, they used the firm-specific 
earnings forecasts from securities analysts to construct a measure of average q that need 
not rely on the stock market. The results of their analysis revealed that after controlling 
for fundamentals using the analysts-based average q, investments appear to be insensiti-
ve to cash flow, even for firms typically thought to be liquidity constrained.
These recent researches have produced three results that cast doubt on the eviden-
ce for financing constraints from the studies based on FHP methodology. First, assuming 
that financing constraints exist, the size of the estimated cash-flow coefficient need not 
be positively related to the degree of the constraints. Second, positive cash-flow coeffici-
ents can be generated without any financing constraints. Finally, the cash-flow effect eit-
her disappears or becomes much smaller when one controls for the measurement error in 
q (Cummins, Hassett and Oliner, 2006). Taking these objections into account, some aut-
hors proposed estimation methods that should overcome these identification problems.
Hovakimian and Titman (2006) tested the sensitivity of firms’ investment to cash funds 
raised from voluntary asset sales. The cash obtained from voluntary sales of assets, which 
are not related to the firm’s main business, is less likely to be correlated with the sellers’ 
future investment opportunities compared to overall cash flow. Further, unless firms are 
financially constrained when raising external funds, there are no reasons to expect that the 
cash from voluntary assets sales would be positively correlated with investments. Quite 
the contrary, to the extent that asset sale is motivated by problems in firms’ business, it is 
not unreasonable to expect that it would be negatively related to investment opportunities 
as well as investment. Hovakimian and Titman (2006) recognized the possibility that cash 
from voluntary assets sale can gain some spurious significance in the investment demand 
equation due to the fact that it is a part of the firm’s overall cash flow. Yet, they argued 
that its significance should not differ cross-sectionally between different types of firms. 
Cross sectional difference is exactly what they found. Namely, their regression analysis 
revealed that the coefficient on contemporaneous assets sales is about eight times higher 
for the firms classified in the financially constrained group compared to the results for 
the unconstrained group. 
To avoid the identification objections, Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) 
proposed a more radically changed method of testing: a test of the link between financial 
constraints and firms’ demand for liquidity. They built a model for firm’s liquidity 
demand which basically formalizes Keynes’ intuition and implements it on the firm’s 
cash demand. The existence of cash demand is grounded in precautionary reasons. Apart 
from uncertainty, the second condition necessary for the existence of precautionary 
cash stocks is financial constraints. A firm which is financially constrained today, and 429
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anticipates financial constraints in the future, will hoard cash flows today in order to 
finance investment opportunities in the future. Nevertheless, cash holding is costly because 
it at the same time implies that the firm must sacrifice today’s investment opportunities. 
The optimal firm cash policy, then, is the one which balances the profitability of today’s 
and future investment opportunities. The solution of the intertemporal maximization 
model for financially constrained firms suggests that changes in firms’ cash holdings 
should be positively correlated with cash flows as well as with the firm’s investment 
opportunities. On the other hand, financially unconstrained firms are always able to finance 
investment projects with a positive NPV. They face no cash holding costs, in terms of 
missed investment opportunities today, or benefits either, in terms of realized investment 
opportunities in the future. Hence, their cash policy should be independent with respect 
to today’s cash flows. In other words, there is no reason to expect that the financially 
unconstrained firm would change its level of cash holding when cash flow changes. To test 
this theory they estimated the following equation for each group of firms separately. 
 ∆ CashHoldings = α0 + α1CashFlowi,t + α2Qi,t + α3Sizei,t + εi,t (27)
As their theory predicts, they found significantly positive α1 and α2 for the group of 
firms that were classified as financially constrained. This indicates that an increase in cash 
flows and/or future investment opportunities induce an increase in the level of cash holding 
of financially constrained firms. In the sample of firms that were classified as financially 
unconstrained, the estimated coefficients of cash flows and Q were much smaller in their 
size and statistically insignificant. 
Almeida and Campello (2007) developed a simple one-period firm investment model 
in which the firm’s ability to raise external finance depends on the amount of collateral 
it can offer to creditors. The amount of collateral is by itself determined by the tangibili-
ty of the firm’s assets. Namely, as far as the creditor is not able to observe the borrower’s 
behaviour and actions it is willing to lend up to the expected value of the firm in liquidati-
on. Since the firm’s liquidation value is determined by the value of its tangible assets, the 
firm’s ability to obtain external funds is proportional to the tangibility of its assets. From 
this relationship they developed further propositions. First, the sensitivity of investment 
to the cash flow of a financially constrained firm should increase with its assets tangibili-
ty. Positive cash flow shocks, let us say ΔH, enable financially constrained firms to incre-
ase investment by the same amount (ΔI = ΔH). Additionally, based on the expected liqu-
idation value of their investment, firms will also be able to obtain credits in some amo-
unt, let us say D. This is the point where assets tangibility creates a difference between 
firms. Namely, the amounts of credits a firm is able to raise will be higher for a firm with 
higher tangible assets (τ2) than for a firm with lower tangible assets (τ1), D2= τ2ΔI > D1= 
τ1ΔI. Hence, the overall increase in investment (ΔI*), due to the same increase in cash 
flow, should be higher for firms with higher tangibility of assets (ΔI2
*= ΔH+D2 > ΔI1
*= 
ΔH+D1). Second, since financially unconstrained firms are not limited by the amount of 
external funds they can raise, their investment cash flow sensitivity should not depend 
on tangibility of assets. Finally, it is hard to find any other reason why asset tangibility 
could possibly have explanatory power with respect to future investment opportunities; 
or the reasons to suspect that assets tangibility can be systematically related to average 430
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q or to errors in its measurement. The results of empirical analysis support the model’s 
predictions. Testing a firm’s level Tobin’s Q investment equation they found that inves-
tment cash flow sensitivity increases with asset tangibility in the sub-sample of financi-
ally constrained firms, but is not affected by asset tangibility in the sub-sample of finan-
cially unconstrained firms. 
Finally, the studies which are also immune to the above objections are the so-called 
natural experiments. These studies tried to identify changes in firms’ investments caused 
by exogenous shifts in firms’ internal funds, that is, by changes that can not be correlated 
with firms’ investment opportunities. For example, Lamont (1997) explored changes in in-
vestments of non-oil segments of oil companies after oil price shocks in 1986. Saudi Arabia 
changed its petroleum policy in the late 1985 and increased production. As a result, crude 
oil prices fell from $26.60 per barrel in December 1985 to $12.67 in April 1986 (Lamont, 
1997: 86). This price reduction, evidently, had a substantial effect on oil companies’ cash 
flows and collateral values. A favourable characteristic of this shock is that it is clearly 
exogenous, that is, uncorrelated with investment opportunities in the oil companies’ non-
oil businesses. If capital markets were perfect, one should not observe any change in in-
vestment behaviour of oil companies’ non-oil businesses compared to the investment be-
haviour of other companies in the same industries (control company group). Yet, Lamont 
(1997) observed that the non-oil branches of oil companies exhibited significantly lower 
rates of investment in 1986 compared to 1985 than other companies in their industries. In 
the same manner, Rauh (2006) used variations in the funding of corporate pension plans 
as a source of exogenous changes in firms’ internal funds. His empirical findings confir-
med a strong and negative response of firms’ investments to exogenous mandatory con-
tributions to employees’ pension funds. Moreover, the strongest effect was found among 
firms classified as financially constrained.
4 Conclusion
The effect of capital market imperfections on real investment has been in the focus 
of much empirical research over the past decades. This literature is rooted in the premise 
that imperfections in credit and equity markets lead to a rationing of external finance, or 
to a difference between the costs of external and internal funds. We presented the literature 
that develops consistent and first-principle based explanations for various capital market 
imperfections based on the asymmetric information assumption. This literature provides an 
answer to the question as to why equity issues make just a small contribution to financing 
firms’ investments, and how it is possible that funds in debt markets can be rationed not 
just by prices but by quantities as well. The implications for the real investments are 
straightforward. If firms are facing problems in raising investment funds externally, their 
investment should not be determined just by the NPV of their projects but also by the 
availability of internal source of finance.
The collapse of the subprime mortgages market at the end of the summer 2007, which 
triggered one of the most severe financial crises in world history, made this literature very 
popular in the broader economic community. However, we found that despite the theo-
retical plausibility of a relationship between capital markets imperfections and real in-431
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vestment, researchers have found it difficult empirically to identify this relationship. The 
main empirical problem of this literature is the inability to directly observe and measure 
the external finance premium. Therefore, this literature relies mainly on indirect empiri-
cal evidence; that is, it is based on studies that aim to identify differences in the behavi-
our of firms that are supposed to face an asymmetric information problem and those that 
are not supposed to face this problem in capital markets. Since the late 80s a large num-
ber of studies detected a significant difference in investments between these groups of 
firms following methodology initiated by FHP. Yet the recent researches of Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997), Gomes (2001), Alti (2003), Cummins, Hassett and Oliner (2006), and 
Whited (2006) cast very serious doubt on the evidence for financing constraints from the 
cash-flow effect on investments. 
We found that identification strategies recently proposed by Hovakimian and Titman 
(2006), and Almeida and Campello (2007) are less subject to these criticisms. Together 
with the so-called natural experiments these strategies seem to be a more promising appro-
ach to identifying this relationship empirically. However, these identification strategies 
are data demanding. Data for asset tangibility, cash-flows from voluntary asset sales and/
or exogenous changes in firms’ internal sources of finance are much less available than 
the data about firms’ cash-flow. This precludes broader application of these identificati-
on strategies. Without information about the significance and size of this channel across 
countries and over time it is very hard to assess its robustness and economic importance 
as well as to analyse its determinants. Consequently, more research is needed to identi-
fy a method not the subject of criticisms related to the use of cash-flow in the investment 
equation, using at the same time more available data.
Overall, we do not suggest that a channel linking capital market imperfections and 
real investment does not exist. The problem of informational asymmetry does affect 
relationships among economic agents in capital markets and it is permanently, not just 
during financial crises, present in these markets. However, the existing empirical literature 
is still unable to provide robust assessments of its size and its economic importance for 
the firms’ investments as well as for the aggregate economic activity. 
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